TEHRAN – Yemen’s Ansarullah movement has been a thorn in the side of Israel since the inception of the genocidal war on Gaza. From the earliest weeks of Israel’s military campaign in October 2023, Sana’a made clear that it would not remain a passive observer. By mid-November 2023, the Ansarullah movement had begun targeting vessels it identified as linked to Israel or bound for Israeli ports.

The attacks were explicitly framed not as an attempt to widen the war, but as a direct response to Israel’s assault on Gaza and as an act of solidarity with the Palestinian people.

From the perspective articulated in Sana’a, the Red Sea operations were a pressure mechanism designed to impose costs on Israel so long as the war continued. The Bab al-Mandeb Strait, one of the world’s most strategic maritime chokepoints, became the arena through which Yemen sought to translate political outrage into tangible leverage. 

The campaign expanded after the United States and the United Kingdom launched airstrikes on Yemeni territory beginning in January 2024. Washington and London justified their actions as necessary to safeguard international navigation. Sana’a, however, interpreted the strikes as direct military intervention aimed at shielding Israel from accountability and obstructing Yemeni operations carried out in support of Palestinian resistance.

In that context, Ansarullah announced that American- and British-linked vessels would also be targeted. The logic presented by Yemeni officials was reactive rather than expansionist: once Western powers entered the battlefield to suppress operations connected to Gaza, they became parties to the confrontation.

It is important to note that the Yemeni leadership consistently tied its maritime operations to developments in Gaza. Public statements emphasized that attacks would cease if Israel halted its campaign and lifted the siege. In this framing, the Red Sea became a secondary front born out of the Gaza war rather than an independent theater of ambition.

A significant shift occurred in the middle of last year when an agreement was announced under the sponsorship of the Sultanate of Oman between Yemen and the American side. The understanding reportedly entailed a halt in operations against American military vessels in the Red Sea. The arrangement came after months of escalation and after Washington had sought to curb Yemeni actions.

Crucially, the agreement did not include commitments by Yemen to stop its pressure on Israel, nor did it reportedly address the broader question of missile capabilities. For Sana’a, this was portrayed as evidence that its deterrent posture had compelled Washington to seek de-escalation concerning its own assets.

This development has generated visible anxiety within Israel. A report recently published by the Israeli newspaper Maariv described Yemen as “Israel’s current nightmare,” reflecting growing concern within political and security circles. According to the newspaper, Israeli officials fear that military pressure and threats against Yemen ultimately led to a swift US-Yemeni understanding that prioritized American interests, while leaving Israel exposed to continued missile and drone capabilities.

The Israeli concern, as outlined in the report, is not merely tactical but strategic. The agreement concluded by US President Donald Trump with Yemen is perceived in Israel as narrowly focused on securing American naval interests without imposing restrictions on Yemeni ballistic missile development. In effect, Washington achieved protection for its own forces while Israel remained within range of an adversary that had demonstrated both resolve and adaptability.

Yemen’s actions are interpreted as an extension of collective deterrence. Far from seeking confrontation for its own sake, Sana’a’s posture has been presented as conditional and reactive: tied explicitly to the continuation of Israel’s war.

Israel’s current unease stems from the realization that conventional airpower has not neutralized Yemen’s capabilities, and that diplomatic arrangements between Washington and Sana’a can proceed without addressing Israeli security priorities.

The fear articulated in Maariv is that a similar pattern could unfold in other arenas: the United States might pursue limited understandings aligned with its immediate interests, while Israel bears the enduring consequences of unresolved missile threats.

Beyond the maritime arena, the Ansarullah movement also carried out missile and drone strikes deep inside Israel, declaring that Israeli cities and strategic facilities would remain within range so long as the assault on Gaza persisted.

Notably, following the October 10, 2025, ceasefire agreement between Israel and Hamas, Yemeni officials announced the suspension of their attacks, reinforcing their claim that their military measures were conditional rather than open-ended.